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Abstract. In the age of Big Data, the amount of data-driven research activities 
has increased significantly. However, when it comes to collaborative data 
processing in scientific workflows, provenance information of the used data is 
not always accessible. Especially in complex data ecosystems with multiple 
decentralized data sources, it is hard to keep track of the processing operations 
once they are completed. When sharing such data between different researchers 
and other involved parties, poor traceability of processing steps may also obstruct 
this process. In this paper, we introduce a blockchain based data provenance 
information system, which enables decentralized sharing of this information. We 
then integrate this system into the decentralized data sources context and address 
trust and traceability issues in the network with an identity-based solution. 
Furthermore, the system’s performance is evaluated, and the concept is examined 
in a case study on the e-Maritime Integrated Reference Platform (eMIR). 
Keywords: data provenance, blockchain, scientific data management. 
1 Introduction 
The automated recording and storage of huge amounts of data is increasingly important 
in both research and industry. The management of such big data data sets has long since 
ceased to be trivial and has become a major challenge for research and industry [1]. 
Additionally, the growing need for high-quality data assets in nearly any branch of 
industry has led to a new awareness of the actual value of data. In a data ecosystem 
controlled by different Data Producers, Data Owners, Data Consumers and Data Miners 
all represented by different physical entities, there is a need for tracking the production, 
transformation, and provision of data [2]. Also, it is a common scenario in industry and 
research that project partners agree on a specific objective and work together with 
different sets of data and data transformation nodes in shared networks. While this often 
happens in private networks, there are also emerging concepts for the usage of 
potentially public data spaces (cf. [3]  for a general description or [4] for a reference 
architecture). Especially in research, specific data often must be selected, pre-
processed, transformed and analyzed from a multitude of data. This digital process 
known as e-Science workflow has been discussed in a great number of publications (see 
e.g. [5] for an introduction to the topic, [6] for a taxonomy of e-Science workflow 
systems, and [7] for a more extensive overview). It is really important to be able to 
track every process step in the e-Science workflow to guarantee a high-quality data-
driven research methodology [8]. Moreover, other researchers must be able to verify 
the authenticity and non-repudiation of the workflow metadata thus created to fully 
understand the process from which research findings have been made. The enormous 
value of scientific data for further processing in industrial applications, such as the 
training of decision-supporting machine learning models cannot be denied. Currently, 
many of the challenges of collaborative data processing are being addressed by 
upcoming cloud-based platform solutions [9]. While the cloud platform provider may 
be trustworthy and reliable, different parties providing, preparing, and transforming the 
data may not. Keeping track of the creation, the changes and the provision of data is a 
challenge in platform supported data spaces. Most of these problems can be observed 
in research activities involving industrial partners with economic interests: For 
instance, how could shipping companies provide data on vessel movement and fuel 
consumption as a basis for a collaborative research project on traffic optimization? 
Also, areas in which multiple partners need to cooperate, as it is done for example in 
the logistics industry, face similar problems: For instance, how could data from 
independent storage and transportation companies be securely made available, be 
processed and analyzed by other companies to gather knowledge about influence 
factors that can affect efficiency? The goal of this paper is to provide a decentral 
solution that closes these gaps and fits into the scientific data ecosystem. Our 
contributions are as follows: Firstly, we describe the setting of data provenance in e-
Science. Secondly, with the assumption of an existing data space setup, we elicit the 
requirements a decentral solution needs to satisfy and motivate how the use of 
blockchain with an identity-based consensus method is best suited to this purpose. 
Thirdly, we present the architecture of our system. Finally, a prototypical 
implementation is evaluated in an example with an existing maritime data space.   
2 Scientific Data Management in a Decentralized Context 
2.1 Scientific Workflows and Data Provenance 
The activity of scientific data management is often presented in cycles or processes. In 
general, this includes the steps from the import of source data to the extraction of 
knowledge from the processed data. This procedure is an important element of e-
Science (electronic science), which deals with the generation of knowledge using 
digital infrastructures [10]. A well-founded and detailed model for the scientific data 
management process is provided by Crowston and Qin [11]. In a comparison of nine 
data management cycles/process models by Ball [12], the model of Crowston and Qin 
is identified as one of the most comprehensive models. Fig. 1 shows a summary of the 
model. For workflow-oriented e-Science, data provenance is a very relevant topic: As 
a large number of publications with data-driven approaches for problem analysis and 
solving is emerging, the insufficient availability of trustworthy traceability measures is 
increasingly becoming a problem [13]. In the case of a poorly documented data 
processing workflow, other researchers would not be able to reproduce the author’s 
results. Buneman et al. [14] define data provenance as follows: “Data provenance – is 
the description of the origins of a piece of data and the process by which it arrived in 
a database”. The work of Simmhan et al. [2] provides a taxonomy of data provenance 
in e-Science: The application of provenance is subdivided into the sections of data 
quality, audit trail, replication recipes, attribution, and informational purposes. It also 
can be distinguished if the provenance information is related to the data product or the 
process of its creation. In this work, we will keep the focus on the audit trail for the 
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Fig. 1. Summary of the Scientific Data Management Process as described by [11]. 
2.2 Decentralized Data in Data Spaces 
The term “data space” is widely used in different contexts. In the scope of this paper, 
we use the definition of data spaces given by Franklin et al. [3] who define a data space 
as a co-existent amount of data which is linked by a “data space support system” (or 
specifically a “data space support platform (DSSP)”). This system must fulfil a set of 
requirements to be recognized as such. Firstly, it must support a wide range of data 
types and formats covering all data in the data space. Secondly, it must offer means of 
searching, querying, updating, and administrating the data space. Data space queries 
are not required to result in a complete result of available data, an approximation is 
sufficient. And lastly, it must support tools to create a tighter integration of the data in 
the data space.  
Data spaces can be found in situations where partial control over or knowledge of 
several data sources is available to a central entity. This central entity, however, is not 
able to maintain full control over the data sources and therefore tasks like data ingestion 
and harmonization are not trivial. Additionally, data spaces typically contain sets of 
syntactically and semantically different data. [15] 
Data space architectures have already been realized in several publications, e.g. as a 
vehicular data space [16], IoT data space [17] or maritime data space [18].  
2.3 Identity-Based Blockchain 
The blockchain concept has increasingly been applied in a large number of cases for 
enhancing cyber security and decentralizing control structures and has also been 
investigated for usage in a scientific research context e.g. in [19]. A blockchain 
typically works like a distributed database with some special functional principles, such 
as finding a network consensus on adding new information to the blockchain. Most 
consensus algorithms for blockchain applications require the cooperation of a vast 
number of nodes in the blockchain network. This often leads to slow performance when 
a new block needs to be accepted. Assuming that a smaller group of nodes with trusted 
identities, and only these nodes are used to determine a consensus, the performance can 
be improved significantly. Consensus algorithms utilizing this assumption are called 
Proof-of-Authority consensus [20]. Another important factor in the application of 
blockchain technology is the permission policy of the network. Common policies for 
blockchain are public, consortium-based, and private. These approaches mainly differ 
in the degree of centralization. Furthermore, permissions for reading data from and 
writing data to the blockchain may also be restricted depending on the permission 
policy of the blockchain [21].   
2.4 Related Work 
For the literature review, we analyze work in the area of data provenance in scientific 
data management with special regards to security, architecture, and workflow models. 
Additionally, we discuss work that uses blockchain technology in the context of storing 
data provenance information. The importance of data provenance for scientific data 
processing has already been discussed in a significant number of publications (see e.g. 
[22] for an overview, and [23], [24] for applications). Additional work on the security 
of data provenance has also been conducted in the past years. The work of Bertino et 
al. [25] gives a good overview of this topic and presents an architecture framework and 
methods for the secure exchange of data provenance. However, collaborative editing of 
this information is not considered. Hasan et al. [26] introduce a formal model for a 
secure provenance chain, in which document editing steps are cryptographically signed 
by their originators. In addition to that, hashes of the changed data are appended to the 
blocks of the editing chain. The model relies on public key cryptography and provides 
a good baseline for the secure provenance documentation. A framework for finding a 
consensus on a valid edit in a network of editing users is not discussed. Closely related 
to the work in this paper are the approaches of Ramachandran et al. [27] and Liang et 
al. [28], which both use a blockchain-based approach for securely organizing data 
provenance information. Ramachandran et al. use the Ethereum blockchain and smart 
contracts with the Open Provenance Model (see [29]) as their base. The consensus on 
a change of a document is determined by voting with all nodes or by randomized 
threshold voting and therefore seems very comprehensible for participants. The 
approach is evaluated with two real-world use-cases and the performance is considered 
applicable by the authors of the paper. Liang et al. also propose a blockchain based 
architecture, which, however, aims at integrating a central cloud-provider that stores 
the data that is being edited. An action-based method for tracking the changes in 
documents is utilized for creating the data provenance information. The blockchain is 
used to carry a distributed database which includes the tracked changes of the 
documents. Both works do not solve the problem of unidentifiable entities and only 
partially discuss the challenges of decentralized data sources. Apart from these papers, 
there are some others that partly address some of the discussed problems. Chen et al. 
[30] present a formal model for a blockchain data structure for efficient sharing of 
scientific workflow provenance data. Neisse et al. [31] discuss different design choices 
of a blockchain-based data provenance approach and their compliance with the GDPR. 
Finally, Tosh et al. [32] compare different consensus methods for cloud-based data 
provenance and come to the conclusion, that a Proof-of-Stake consensus seems to be 
the best method in such a setup.  
2.5 Research Objective 
There is an increasing need for data provenance solutions for scientific data 
management. Especially in data space environments, solutions with the ability to handle 
a high degree of decentralization of data need to be developed. In existing work, the 
problem of permissions to edit provenance information or having the right to vote for 
appending new data provenance information is not solved entirely. An identity-based 
permission system could possibly solve this issue and establish trust in a system of 
different editing parties. Also, the existing architectures cannot address the decentrality 
of the actual data in a data space setup. Requirements for scientific data processing are 
also only being discussed partially. Therefore, a permissioned, identity-based 
blockchain seems to be a candidate technology for establishing a data provenance 
information system. This seems to fit best to the presented scenario, as a central ledger 
infrastructure may not be able to establish overall trust. Moreover, it would require an 
independent organization to govern the ledger and protect it against security risks. 
While it is still possible to have authenticated and authorized entities, a central party 
would need to take the responsibility for the system, which would be a problem with 
several parties that may have conflicting interests that would have to be resolved for 
each workflow individually. A data provenance information system must be able to 
ensure the secure documentation of data provenance information and its consistency 
with the actual data in a trustworthy and reliable way for authorized entities. 
Additionally, it should be visible to researchers who authored the data provenance 
information. The system should be adapted to the needs of a data-driven science 
process, being able to track single workflow steps of data processing.   
3 Design of the Data Provenance Blockchain with Identifiable 
Entities 
3.1 Architectural Components 
To introduce a secure documentation of data provenance in scientific workflows, 
several architectural components are required.  Fig. 2 gives an overview of the involved 
entities and components and their interactions. We assume, that an existing data space 
is present and has a DSSP as the corresponding support system (cf. section 2.2) as this 
setup is one of the most common solutions. 






















Fig. 2. Architecture overview of the data provenance management concept. 
The architectural components can be described as follows: 
• Identity Provider: The Identity Provider is assumed to be a trusted entity with the 
function of providing cryptographic key-pairs linked to legal entities. Prerequisite 
for this is the existence of a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). The Identity Provider 
is needed for the identity-based consensus in our blockchain setup.  
• Data Space Support Platform (DSSP): The Data Space Support Platform is the 
access point for data space access requests. It may also fulfil the functions of a Data 
Processing Entity as workflow steps of the e-Science Workflow may also be 
executed on the platform. 
• Data Processing Entity: The Data Processing Entity is processing data from or 
provides data to the data space, which it accesses via the DSSP. Several Data 
Processing Entities can be involved in the processing of a single data set. 
• Blockchain Data Storage: The Blockchain Data Storage contains the actual data 
provenance information and may also be used to organize data space access rights 
via smart contracts.  
When a dataset is created, the originator, i.e. the first Data Processing Entity, provides 
first information on the data and makes the data available to the data space via the 
DSSP. The metadata of the data creation is then stored in the blockchain and can be 
retrieved by the next Data Processing Entity in the workflow. The data is then again 
processed, made available to the data space and the metadata is stored in the blockchain. 
Access to the blockchain always requires a cryptographic identity, provided by the 
Identity Provider.  
 
3.2 Data Provenance Model 
The classes and attributes of a data provenance model always depend on their use-case 
and the domain they are applied to. The data provenance model in our approach should 
describe the creation and processing of scientific data in e-Science workflows. We 
assume, that every transformation of the data can be partitioned into a chain of single 
processing steps. As a proof of concept, we use a simple workflow-oriented model 
whose steps are derived from the tasks of Crowston and Qin’s model (see section 2.1). 
We design this model in such a way that it can act as a template and can be extended 
further easily. Hence, we deliberately keep the attributes in our model general. We 
generalize the steps of the e-Science workflow to the following tasks: Data Acquisition 
Process, Anonymization (to comply with data protection regulations), Data Quality 
Analysis, Preprocessing and Transformation and Conversion and Validation. A 
formalized model of the proposed tasks is used to represent the data provenance 
information. Instances of this model for workflow steps can be serialized and then 
stored in the body of a blockchain block. The stakeholders in the processing of scientific 
data in our data space set-up can be modelled through the following roles (cf. [4]): 
Data Owner. The Data Owner is considered possessing the actual data. This can be 
interpreted in a legal or technical sense and is not further specified for our approach. 
The Data Owner determines the access rights to the data. 
Data Provider. The Data Provider is an entity which provides the technical means to 
access a specific data set. The Data Provider must be authorized by the Data Owner and 
only provide the data to other entities with access rights granted by the Data Owner. 
Data Consumer. The Data Consumer is accessing a data set as a client of the Data 
Provider. 
Physical entities in this model can also have multiple roles at the same time. Refer to 
section 4.1 for an example. 
3.3 Blockchain Architecture 
Identities. In a collaborative research scenario, the anonymity (as e.g. found in crypto-
currency blockchains) of Data Processing Entities would lead to less traceability and 
trust between different parties as manipulations of the data would not cause any 
negative reputation for the guilty parties. Furthermore, the research community would 
benefit from a secure and transparent documentation of data processing workflows as 
investigations become easier reproducible. In our context, it is not a given that the 
transformations on a data set always can be reproduced and verified (against a hash) by 
any participant. Hence, for our system we require technological measures to be in place 
so that an entity that has processed data cannot repudiate their processing step and can 
be held responsible for the result. These considerations lead to the conclusion that a 
blockchain, applied to this problem would only fulfil its purpose if Data Processing 
Entities in a scientific workflow can be identified. We assume that physical identities 
are bound to cryptographic key pairs. To obtain such a key pair, Data Processing entities 
must fulfil several requirements, which are defined through the Identity Provider. These 
could be for example the evidence that a Data Processing Entity is part of a legally 
registered organization. After obtaining a key pair and a certificate stating its validity 
from the Identity Provider, the Data Processing Entity can participate in the blockchain 
network (see Fig. 2). Every transaction in the network that is committed by a Data 
Processing Entity must be signed with its private key, so that other entities can trace his 
interactions with the processed data. 
Transactions. Storing data provenance information in the blockchain can be achieved 
in several different ways. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that any data, which is 
stored in a conventional blockchain is replicated by every node in the network and 
therefore causes traffic. Typically, data that is stored in a blockchain can be represented 
as transactions. From the perspective of a data space entity, the smallest monitorable 
change of a data set in our model is a single workflow step. For an entity who is 
executing a workflow step, there may be smaller processing steps as parts of its 
implementation of the workflow step, but these are normally not visible to any other 
entities. Hence, it is appropriate to define a workflow step as a transaction in the 
blockchain. Transactions also must contain a hash of the processed data to later enable 
other entities to verify that a transaction was related to a specific workflow step. This 
binds the data provenance information in the blockchain to the actual data set. In 
addition to the hash, meta-information (see section 3.2) for processing the data by the 
system is also stored. However, this information cannot always be expected to include 
exact descriptions of used processes, as they may contain proprietary algorithms.   
Blockchain Structure. It must be kept in mind, that in a data space, there is not only a 
single data set, that is being processed by its entities. Thus, there are several chains of 
transactions that must be stored in the blockchain network. For this reason, we propose 
to use multiple shorter chains, each representing a workflow for a single source data set 
(see Fig. 3).  




















Fig. 3. Data set specific blockchain setup with multiple chains. 
This has some advantages over a conventional, single blockchain: First, permissions 
can easily be set for every data set separately. Also, entities do not need to keep track 
of data sets, which they are not permissioned to access or not interested in. This reduces 
the locally used storage of the blockchain instance and prevents entities from wasting 
their computational resources to track transactions, in which they do not have any 
interests. To keep track of the different chains in the network, the DSSP can provide a 
central lookup table or any other means for optimizing access to the blockchain 
network. This task falls directly within the remit of such a platform. The permission 
model and deployment of the blockchain should follow a standardized process. In a 
more proprietary setup, Data Owner, Provider and Consumer may also have problems 
on finding a consensus on a process, even in a small group due to conflicting interests 
or because data exchange setups can also be dynamic or even fully automated. 
Standardization will largely prevent the occurrence of these problems and support the 
balance between administrative burden and benefits of the proposed method. 
Standardized procedures can also be supported by the DSSP. 
Consensus and Smart Contracts. In the defined setup, the stakeholders in the process 
of data processing in the data space have been clearly identified. The existence of an 
Identity Provider now makes it possible to use a Proof-of-Authority (or identity-based) 
consensus method. The Data Owner of a source data set has been defined as the entity 
which holds the rights to distribute and modify the data set. We propose that the Data 
Owner nominates a subset of entities in the network that are authorized to vote on data 
provenance auditing for the data provenance information related to the specific data set 
(see Fig. 4).  
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Fig. 4. Conceptual overview of Proof-of-Authority consensus mechanism. 
The Data Owner can verify the identities of these validators via the Identity Provider. 
It is left open how the Data Owner determines this subset, as there can be several legal, 
organizational, or technical requirements which will be specific to the case. For 
example, the authorization of being a validator may include contractual agreements, 
which require validators to pay penalties, if agreements are violated. In return, a Data 
Owner may provide access to its data or act as a validator for the other party. Also, for 
scenarios with a stronger need to protect data, entities may also consider paying an 
independent organization to provide validation facilities. However, in the case of 
working with highly sensitive data, validators must be included in the process of the 
data processing and may be selected from the set of existent and authorized Data 
Processing Entities for validating the data processing steps of other authorized Data 
Processing Entities. Also, in less critical workflows, validators may also base their 
decisions on data processing metadata, without requiring access to the actual data sets.  
Anytime a new block will be added to the blockchain, only the validators vote on the 
changes included in this block. In this way, our setup fulfils the definition of a 
consortium blockchain. Consensus algorithms like e.g. Aura or Clique can be used to 
implement the building of a consensus [20].   
In the near past and with the approach of the Ethereum blockchain, so-called smart 
contracts have been in the focus of blockchain researchers and developers [33]. Smart 
contracts are pieces of code, which run on the blockchain and execute contract terms 
that have been defined in the code [34]. In the arrangement in Fig. 4, the Data 
Processing Entity accesses and processes the data, provided by the Data Owner via the 
data space. We propose to use the data provenance blockchain to deploy smart contracts 
between the Data Owner and Data Processing Entities for the determination of access, 
modification, and distribution rights of data sets. The smart contracts will be deployed 
on the blockchain that is linked to the corresponding workflow. The DSSP can then 
subscribe to these smart contracts and manage data space access accordingly. 
Additionally, the nomination of validators may also be carried out via a smart contract. 
This formalizes the processes of data and right management and makes it decentrally 
available to all authorized parties. This completes our system design. 
3.4 Security Analysis  
The proposed system stores data provenance information without giving unauthorized 
parties the possibility to tamper with this information or its consistency with the data 
sets it relates to. Moreover, the system provides traceability (transactions can be traced 
to a legal identity) and non-repudiation (a participant cannot deny having carried out a 
transaction on the data set): this is implemented via the signatures within the blockchain 
structure and the binding of the access control to the data sets to the permissions given 
through the blockchain structure. We analyze what can happen when an unauthorized 
or authorized entity is compromised as well as blockchain specific attacks: 
Threat 1: Unauthorized entities. When an unauthorized entity tries to add false 
information to the data provenance blockchain, this will be detected by the validators 
of the blockchain and the transaction will be discarded due to invalid signatures.  
Similarly, unauthorized entities will not have access rights to tamper with the data set.  
Threat 2: Compromised validators. In general, there must be a significant amount of 
compromised validators [20], which is relatively unlikely in a data space setup with 
independent validators. However, if the Data Owner nominates a set of highly 
dependent validators this can become a security issue if he does not ensure that they are 
highly trustworthy at the same time. Also, conspiring validators will suffer a loss of 
reputation and possibly legal consequences if this attack is detected.  
Threat 3: Compromised Data Owner. If a Data Owner is compromised, then he will 
perhaps be able to provide fake data within the original data set. However, since he 
must sign the data provenance information in the blockchain it cannot be denied having 
made the claim that it is real data later. Hence, when someone discovers that the data is 
not authentic, the compromised Data Owner risks his repudiation as Data Provider or 
could even be made liable if damage is caused. If a compromised Data Owner tries to 
tamper with the transactions or adds transactions, he is not authorized for then this will 
be spotted by the validators. Even though as the Data Owner he could nominate 
conspirator validators this is unlikely (cf. Threat 2). The case of a compromised Data 
Processing Entity is analogous. 
Threat 4: Compromised DSSP lookup table. If the lookup table would contain false 
information, this would only lead to false access in the blockchain, which would be 
detected by any entity verifying the signatures or hash-values in the blockchain by cross 
checking with the identities of the expected entities with the help of the Identity 
Provider. The attacker might still duplicate a chain or prefix of a chain. However, this 
will not cause any harm as each block (describing data transactions) contains the hash 
of the actual data, and this data hash is cryptographically bound together with the 
metadata by the signature of the processing party. Moreover, if a regular party or the 
attacker tries to add blocks to a duplicated blockchain or prefix in a way that would 
lead to a fork of the workflow with respect to the respective blockchain then this will 
not pass the consensus algorithm as usual. If the attacker tries to add a new block with 
an inconsistent match between metadata and an existing data set, then this will be 
detected by the validating nodes as usual. At most, if the attacker duplicates a prefix of 
a chain the information that a data set was deleted might be lost, and a regular party 
who follows the corresponding link will not be able to access the data set as expected. 
In general, duplication is less of a problem here than in currency blockchains since the 
data sets and their provenance records are not "consumed" but rather a derived data set 
has to be deleted explicitly. 
Threat 5: General blockchain attack scenario. There are a few general attack scenarios 
against a blockchain instance [35]. Attacks in which single nodes flood the blockchain 
with transactions are possible. Not all these attacks are always applicable. Since we 
deploy multiple chains with different permissions this will typically affect only a small 
section of our proposed blockchain network.  
Threat 6: Compromised Identity Provider. A compromised Identity Provider would 
have fatal consequences for the proposed system. An attacker could invalidate the 
identities of authorized nodes, masquerade as an existing identity, and create new, 
malicious identities. A countermeasure for this attack would be the utilization of an 
identity provider with decentralized structures (see also section 4.1).  
This high-level analysis is only meant to show that the presented system is also 
promising with respect to security. We will provide a detailed design and state-of-the-
art verification of the cryptographic architecture together with a resilience analysis in 
case of key compromises in future work. 
4 Evaluation 
4.1 Case Study: AIS Data Processing in a Maritime Data Space 
In 2002 The Automatic Identification System (AIS) was introduced by the IMO 
SOLAS Agreement. It facilitates the submission of dynamic and static vessel properties 
(such as position, speed, destination, size, etc.) by vessels via VHF. Several 
publications make use of historical AIS data in their research process (see e.g. [36] for 
AIS-based collision risk analysis, [37] for anomaly detection or [38] for route 
prediction). Even though AIS is not encrypted and theoretically can be recorded by 
anyone, it requires powerful equipment to record it for larger areas. For this reason, it 
is often the case, that AIS data for a specific area needs to be exchanged between the 
recorder and users of the data, which is a typical business case in the maritime data 
domain (see e.g. MarineTraffic1). As a representative scientific workflow for a 
maritime data space, we use the process of creating a heat map for vessel traffic density 
 
1 https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/p/ais-historical-data 
for the German Bight from raw AIS data (in the NMEA0183 format, see [39]). Traffic 
density heat maps can especially be useful for traffic optimization and could, for 
instance, be used as a data source by Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) for optimizing 
traffic efficiency. For implementing this process, the e-Maritime Integrated Reference 
Platform (eMIR) [40], which offers an open modular research and test environment 
used for scientific analysis of maritime systems and data generation with a variety of 
maritime data sources, is utilized. The workflow is illustrated in Fig. 5: eMIR2 uses a 
network of distributed sensors to continuously record the raw AIS messages from 
vessels in the German Bight (approx. 2.700.000 messages per day). This data is 
persisted in a PostgreSQL database. As AIS data contains public, unique ship identifiers 
(MMSI and IMO numbers), which must be treated as personal information, the data is 
anonymized by replacing the MMSI and IMO with a hashed value. All of this is done 
by an arbitrary Organization A (Data Owner / Data Provider) to create the source data 
set, which is distributed via the data space. In our example, Organization B (Data 
Consumer/ Data Provider) uses this data set as a starting point for enhancing the data 
for further processing: Faulty entries are removed, and unnecessary attributes are 
filtered. A data science researcher from Organization C (Data Consumer) can then use 
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Fig. 5. Workflow for creating a Vessel Traffic Heatmap in a maritime data space. 
For the realization, we instantiated the proposed concept in section 3 in the eMIR data 
space setup to operate with its available resources. Fig. 6 illustrates a technical 
overview of the realization for this case study: The Maritime Connectivity Platform3 
(MCP) is a platform to support the implementation of digital services for supporting 
the maritime industry and was selected as an identity provider as it features a 
decentralized management of identities (cf. Threat 6 in section 3.4). For the realization 
of the blockchain network, R3’s Corda Open Source4 was selected as it provides 
interfaces to model real-world relations independently from crypto-currency features. 
Furthermore, it was optimized to run as a permissioned blockchain network and allows 
easy integration of blockchain peers and data processing logic. The process for creating 
the heatmap is completely automated and can for example be executed daily for 
tracking changes in traffic. In our case, we worked with data sets of 1.000.000 AIS data 
points. The documentation of the workflow in our system starts with the internal data 





















Fig. 6. Realization of the data provenance information system with Corda OS and the MCP. 
Note, that the data acquisition, conversion, and anonymization cannot be observed by 
other participants of the data space. However, as the data is bound to the transactions 
by its hashes and the transactions are signed by their originator, the data and their 
processing could be revealed later in case of discrepancies to proof the validity of the 
data provenance information. For a single instance of the workflow, a total of six 
workflow steps were added to the data provenance system adding ~3KB of provenance 
data to the blockchain (per million AIS data points). Assuming ~2.7 million AIS data 
points are recorded per day, this would create ~9KB of provenance data in the 
blockchain per day, for the presented workflow. Finally, the case study successfully 
showed the applicability of the proposed concept. It could be seen that our concept can 
be integrated into existing workflows and the workflow model can be used to represent 
typical data processing steps. However, the integration of existing infrastructure, such 
as external identity providers is not always trivial. In our example, MIR keys could not 
directly be integrated into to the Corda OS framework, as they did not match the 
cryptographic requirements. For this reason, we authorized the Corda CA certificates 
making use of the MIR keys for each entity and made this information available via the 
DSSP for validation of signatures (as shown in Fig. 6). Finally, it could be shown that 
the system can be used to support typical data exchange problems that can be found in 
the maritime data domain and close the gaps of existing work. Gaining global data 
coverage for larger areas is very important to the international maritime industry. As 
this task is often not achievable for a single entity, data needs to be exchanged and 
analyzed collaboratively.  
4.2 Performance Evaluation 
We have implemented and evaluated a network of nodes that allows us to consider 
complete workflows and several validators. We used a typical windows machine (AMD 
Ryzen 7 1700 @ 3 GHz, 16 GB RAM) for performance testing. Our focus in this 
evaluation is on changes in the node-setup, to derive implementation/setup-independent 
performance insights. Therefore, we mainly used a network of 10 nodes with different 
workflows and role set-ups (as shown in Table 1). 
Table 1. Performance evaluation results.5 
Number of Nodes Workflow Setup Avg. Time per 
Transaction 
10 1 Workflow, 1 Validator 1860 ms 
10 1 Workflow, 2 Validators 2366 ms 
10 1 Workflow, 4 Validators 2801 ms 
10 1 Workflow, 6 Validators 3379 ms 
10 2 Workflows, 2 Validators each 1364 ms 
10 3 Workflows, 1 Validator each 790 ms 
5 1 Workflow, 2 Validators 1195 ms 
In the first four trials we set up a single workflow and constantly raised the number of 
validators for that workflow. Consequently, the average time per transaction also 
significantly increased. This is obviously due to the higher number of nodes that need 
to communicate to find a consensus on adding a new workflow step. As stated in section 
3.4, a higher number of validators increases the security of the system. Finding the right 
balance of security and performance in terms of validators therefore can be identified 
as a challenge of the proposed system and could lead to poorly configured systems. 
Secondly, we investigated how parallel-running workflows affect the performance of 
the system. With the same number of nodes and validators (cf. rows 3 and 5 of Table 
1), we already have a 52% faster transaction speed with two parallel workflows. 
Additionally, we conducted a test with 5 nodes and 2 validators in a single workflow. 
It was seen that two parallel running workflows almost have the same performance as 
a single workflow (cf. rows 5 and 7 of  Table 1). We interpret this as a result of our 
permissioned approach with multiple chains. Lastly, it could be seen that the ‘time per 
transaction’-measurements for our case study were already relatively high. According 
to R3 Ltd. [41], this seems to be a general problem of the open source implementation 
of Corda and is probably not related to our consensus mechanism. Also, due to our 
blockchain architecture, we do not expect scenarios in which thousands of participants 
issue transactions at a single blockchain instance. For an increasing number workflows, 
the system can easily and efficiently be scaled horizontally by adding additional 
blockchain instances as the results of the performance evaluation could show. 
4.3 Extended Example: Setting with Confidential Data Sets 
We now extend our case study to illustrate how our design can handle a setting where 
two participating organizations are competitors and have therefore an interest in 
keeping some of their data sets confidential. Assume there are three more participating 
 
5 Our implementation is available under: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3960262 . 
organizations D, E, and F: both, D and E, are companies that specialize in algorithms 
to optimize AIS data sets for use in ship navigation systems; F is a company that 
develops ship navigation systems (potential client of both D and E). Moreover, E 
wishes to provide a demo service, where F could view up to three results of their latest 
algorithm run on data sets selected by F from the data space. Naturally, E does not wish 
that competitors such as D have access to the resulting data sets. With many demo data 
sets publicly available a competitor could at some point be able to reengineer the 
algorithm. The participants in this example will choose a legal contract (from a set of 
standardized templates) where every industrial participant is allowed to restrict access 
to data sets that result from one of their processing steps to other industrial participants 
of their choice. These in turn are then also bound to confidentiality (by the legal 
contract). Technically, E will establish a secret key K with F, encrypt the confidential 
data set under K, and only store it in encrypted form on the data space. The data hash 
for the provenance blockchain can be computed over the encrypted data set. Hence, the 
workings of the blockchain system are as usual. Naturally, this is also an example for 
the case when the validators will neither be able to nor obliged to verify that the 
processed data set is indeed the result of the transformation described in the data 
provenance information. Other scenarios where confidential data must be accessed by 
several participants can make use of multi-party key establishment schemes.      
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this work, we designed a blockchain-based data provenance system and integrated it 
into an existing data space setup. For this purpose, a scientific workflow-based model 
was utilized to track each data processing step of an e-Science approach. We used an 
external Identity Provider and a Proof-of-Authority-like consensus method to secure 
the blockchain against attacks and make the process of data provenance for scientific 
workflows more transparent and verifiable. Our multi-chain concept for separating data 
provenance information by their belonging workflows improved security and 
performance of the system. However, we identified the need to carefully consider 
certificate and performance requirements for implementations of our system. Also, the 
cases of several data sets being merged by a processing step or forks on the chain of 
data processing need to be evaluated further. We expect that our framework can easily 
be extended to these cases since it seems the best strategy to generate a new data set in 
such cases. The scenario of continuously changing data processing entities as 
permissioned users also should be investigated further as transactions in a blockchain-
setup are immutable. In general, we aim to further integrate our concept into the data 
architecture of the eMIR Platform to provide an overall architecture for collaborative 
data science and integrated data provenance tracking. As the volume, variety and 
velocity of available data is increasing continuously, we cannot deny that data 
provenance management will play an equally important role. Collaborative e-Science 
has a big impact on today’s research methodologies and needs solutions for trust issues 
and the problem of decentralized data. We expect concepts like ours to fill these gaps 
in the future and provide a secure and efficient possibility to track data provenance. 
References 
1. McAfee, A., Brynjolfsson, E., Davenport, T.H., Patil, D., Barton, D.: Big data: the 
management revolution. Harvard business review. 90, 60–68 (2012). 
2. Simmhan, Y.L., Plale, B., Gannon, D.: A survey of data provenance in e-science. ACM 
Sigmod Record. 34, 31–36 (2005). 
3. Franklin, M., Halevy, A., Maier, D.: From databases to dataspaces: a new abstraction for 
information management. ACM Sigmod Record. 34, 27–33 (2005). 
4. Otto, B., Steinbuß, S., et al.: International Data Space - Reference Architecture Model, 
https://www.internationaldataspaces.org/ressource-hub/publications-ids/, (2019). 
5. Belloum, A., Inda, M.A., Vasunin, D., Korkhov, V., Zhao, Z., Rauwerda, H., Breit, T.M., 
Bubak, M., Hertzberger, L.O.: Collaborative e-science experiments and scientific 
workflows. IEEE Internet Computing. 15, 39–47 (2011). 
6. Deelman, E., Gannon, D., Shields, M., Taylor, I.: Workflows and e-Science: An overview 
of workflow system features and capabilities. Future generation computer systems. 25, 528–
540 (2009). 
7. Taylor, I.J., Deelman, E., Gannon, D.B., Shields, M.: Workflows for e-Science: scientific 
workflows for grids. Springer (2007). 
8. Rousidis, D., Garoufallou, E., Balatsoukas, P., Sicilia, M.-A.: Metadata for Big Data: a 
preliminary investigation of metadata quality issues in research data repositories. 
Information services & use. 34, 279–286 (2014). 
9. Jayaraman, P.P., Perera, C., Georgakopoulos, D., Dustdar, S., Thakker, D., Ranjan, R.: 
Analytics‐as‐a‐service in a multi‐cloud environment through semantically‐enabled 
hierarchical data processing. Software: Practice and Experience. 47, 1139–1156 (2017). 
10. Humphrey, C.: e-Science and the Life Cycle of Research. (2006). 
11. Crowston, K., Qin, J.: A capability maturity model for scientific data management: 
Evidence from the literature. Proceedings of the American Society for Information Science 
and Technology. 48, 1–9 (2011). 
12. Ball, A.: Review of data management lifecycle models. University of Bath, IDMRC (2012). 
13. Verbert, K., Manouselis, N., Drachsler, H., Duval, E.: Dataset-driven research to support 
learning and knowledge analytics. Journal of Educational Technology & Society. 15, 133–
148 (2012). 
14. Buneman, P., Khanna, S., Wang-Chiew, T.: Why and where: A characterization of data 
provenance. In: International conference on database theory. pp. 316–330. Springer (2001). 
15. Halevy, A., Franklin, M., Maier, D.: Principles of dataspace systems. Presented at the 
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on 
Principles of database systems (2006). 
16. Rettore, P.H., Maia, G., Villas, L.A., Loureiro, A.A.: Vehicular Data Space: The Data Point 
of View. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials. 21, 2392–2418 (2019). 
17. Curry, E., Derguech, W., Hasan, S., Kouroupetroglou, C., ul Hassan, U.: A real-time linked 
dataspace for the internet of things: enabling “pay-as-you-go” data management in smart 
environments. Future Generation Computer Systems. 90, 405–422 (2019). 
18. Berre, A., Rødseth, Ø.: From digital twin to maritime data space: Transparent ownership 
and use of ship information. Presented at the September 27 (2018). 
19. Shrestha, A.K., Vassileva, J.: Blockchain-based research data sharing framework for 
incentivizing the data owners. In: International Conference on Blockchain. pp. 259–266. 
Springer (2018). 
20. De Angelis, S., Aniello, L., Baldoni, R., Lombardi, F., Margheri, A., Sassone, V.: PBFT vs 
proof-of-authority: Applying the CAP theorem to permissioned blockchain. (2018). 
21. Zheng, Z., Xie, S., Dai, H., Chen, X., Wang, H.: An overview of blockchain technology: 
Architecture, consensus, and future trends. Presented at the 2017 IEEE international 
congress on big data (BigData congress) (2017). 
22. Bowers, S.: Scientific workflow, provenance, and data modeling challenges and 
approaches. Springer (2012). 
23. Chen, P., Plale, B., Aktas, M.S.: Temporal representation for scientific data provenance. In: 
2012 IEEE 8th International Conference on E-Science. pp. 1–8. IEEE (2012). 
24. Bowers, S., McPhillips, T., Ludäscher, B., Cohen, S., Davidson, S.B.: A model for user-
oriented data provenance in pipelined scientific workflows. In: International Provenance 
and Annotation Workshop. pp. 133–147. Springer (2006). 
25. Bertino, E., Ghinita, G., Kantarcioglu, M., Nguyen, D., Park, J., Sandhu, R., Sultana, S., 
Thuraisingham, B., Xu, S.: A roadmap for privacy-enhanced secure data provenance. J 
Intell Inf Syst. 43, 481–501 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10844-014-0322-7. 
26. Hasan, R., Sion, R., Winslett, M.: The Case of the Fake Picasso: Preventing History Forgery 
with Secure Provenance. (2009). 
27. Ramachandran, A., Kantarcioglu, D.: Using blockchain and smart contracts for secure data 
provenance management. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.10000. (2017). 
28. Liang, X., Shetty, S., Tosh, D., Kamhoua, C., Kwiat, K., Njilla, L.: ProvChain: A 
Blockchain-Based Data Provenance Architecture in Cloud Environment with Enhanced 
Privacy and Availability. Presented at the May 16 (2017). 
29. Moreau, L., Clifford, B., Freire, J., Futrelle, J., Gil, Y., Groth, P., Kwasnikowska, N., Miles, 
S., Missier, P., Myers, J.: The open provenance model core specification (v1. 1). Future 
generation computer systems. 27, 743–756 (2011). 
30. Chen, W., Liang, X., Li, J., Qin, H., Mu, Y., Wang, J.: Blockchain Based Provenance 
Sharing of Scientific Workflows. In: 2018 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big 
Data). pp. 3814–3820 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1109/BigData.2018.8622237. 
31. Neisse, R., Steri, G., Nai-Fovino, I.: A blockchain-based approach for data accountability 
and provenance tracking. In: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on 
Availability, Reliability and Security. pp. 1–10 (2017). 
32. Tosh, D., Shetty, S., Liang, X., Kamhoua, C., Njilla, L.: Consensus protocols for 
blockchain-based data provenance: Challenges and opportunities. Presented at the October 
1 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1109/UEMCON.2017.8249088. 
33. Alharby, M., van Moorsel, A.: Blockchain Based Smart Contracts : A Systematic Mapping 
Study. Presented at the August 26 (2017). https://doi.org/10.5121/csit.2017.71011. 
34. Zheng, Z., Xie, S., Dai, H.-N., Chen, X., Wang, H.: Blockchain challenges and 
opportunities: A survey. International Journal of Web and Grid Services. 14, 352–375 
(2018). 
35. Xu, J.J.: Are blockchains immune to all malicious attacks? Financial Innovation. 2, 25 
(2016). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-016-0046-5. 
36. Silveira, P., Teixeira, A., Soares, C.G.: Use of AIS data to characterise marine traffic 
patterns and ship collision risk off the coast of Portugal. The Journal of Navigation. 66, 
879–898 (2013). 
37. Ristic, B., La Scala, B., Morelande, M., Gordon, N.: Statistical analysis of motion patterns 
in AIS data: Anomaly detection and motion prediction. In: information fusion, 2008 11th 
international conference on. pp. 1–7. IEEE (2008). 
38. Pallotta, G., Vespe, M., Bryan, K.: Vessel Pattern Knowledge Discovery from AIS Data: A 
Framework for Anomaly Detection and Route Prediction. Entropy. 15, 2218–2245 (2013). 
39. Langley, R.B.: NMEA 0183: A GPS receiver interface standard. GPS world. 6, (1995). 
40. Rüssmeier, N., Lamm, A., Hahn, A.: A Generic Testbed for Simulation and Physical Based 
Testing of Maritime Cyber-Physical System of Systems. Presented at the November 14 
(2019). 
41. R3 Ltd.: Corda - Sizing and performance, https://docs.corda.net/docs/corda-
enterprise/3.3/sizing-and-performance.html, last accessed 2020/11/05. 
 
